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Abstract
This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly fire (FF).
We define cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems
against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintentionally harms the mission effectiveness of
friendly or neutral forces. We describe examples of cyber FF and discuss how it fits within a general conceptual
framework for cyber security failures. Because it involves human failure, cyber FF may be considered to belong to a
sub-class of cyber security failures characterized as unintentional insider threats. Cyber FF is closely related to combat
friendly fire in that maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding unintended consequences. Cyber
SA concerns knowledge of a system’s topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and
critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the
system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and offensive
countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. We describe a test bed designed to support
empirical research on factors affecting cyber FF. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF, including
both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches.
Introduction
Computer and network security are among the greatest
challenges to maintaining effective information systems
in public, private, and military organizations. In defining
computer security, Landwehr [1] described three threats
to Information systems: (1) the unauthorized disclosure of
information, (2) the unauthorized modification of infor-
mation, and (3) the unauthorized withholding of informa-
tion (e.g., denial of service or DoS). Denning [2] referred
to information warfare as a struggle between an offen-
sive and a defensive player over an information resource,
with outcomes that may affect availability or integrity of
the resource. While much attention has been devoted to
combating external threats such as worms, viruses, and
DoS attacks, actions by insiders pose a significant threat
to computer and network security. This insider threat,
however, is not confined to “bad actors” that intention-
ally performmalicious acts against an information system.
Just as unintended actions by friendly forces may impact
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physical resources and security of friendly forces in mil-
itary engagements, the actions of well-intentioned cyber
defenders may result in harm to information resources
and security. The focus of the present paper is on under-
standing and mitigating threats to intelligence and secu-
rity informatics posed by cyber friendly fire.
While friendly fire (FF) is a familiar term, cyber FF is a
relatively new concept for the information security com-
munity. An initial proposed definition of cyber FF, from
Greitzer et al. [3], emphasizes three key characteristics:
• Cyber/electronic actions are performed intentionally,
• Actions are offensive or defensive,
• Actions result in inhibiting, damaging, or destroying
friendly or neutral infrastructure or operations.
Andrews and Jabbour [4] provide the second:
The employment of friendly cyber defenses and weapons
with the intent of either defending the blue cyber
systems from attack from red or gray forces, or attacking
the enemy to destroy or damage their people,
equipment, or facilities, which results in unforeseen and
unintentional damage to friendly cyber systems.
© 2014 Carroll et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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Carroll et al. Security Informatics 2014, 3:13 Page 2 of 14
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/13
These definitions have many similarities: cyber FF is a
consequence of offensive or defensive actions, the actions
were performed with purpose, and the damage occurs to
friendly or neutral cyber assets. Both definitions imply or
overtly identify consequences of the action as uninten-
tional. Furthermore, incidents that are born from acci-
dents, negligence, carelessness, or malicious insiders are
not friendly fire. From there, the definitions diverge.
Greitzer et al. consider harm to both cyber systems and
mission effectiveness, while Andrews and Jabbour focus
only on systems. A recent Air Force chief scientist’s report
on technology horizons mentions the need for “a funda-
mental shift in emphases from ‘cyber protection’ to ‘main-
taining mission effectiveness’ in the presence of cyber
threats” [5]. Thus, mission effectiveness, and not only sys-
tems, is an appropriate focus for friendly fire incidents. In
addition, we argue that cyber FF consequences may be felt
well beyond cyber space [6]. Consider cyber physical sys-
tems that closely integrate physical, computational, and
communication components to sense and effect changes
in the real world. These systems are heavily employed in
critical infrastructure to control and monitor processes.
Adversely impacting the operation of these systems may
result in large-scale power failures, toxic waste releases,
or explosions that can have catastrophic consequences on
the environment and life.
Given these considerations, a revised definition of
cyber FF [6] is:
Cyber friendly fire is intentional offensive or defensive
cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber
systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber
systems, which unintentionally harms the mission
effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces.
The following two examples illustrate cyber FF incidents
that derive from defensive actions that unintentionally
harm the organization’s missions:
Illustrative Example 1. As a cost saving measure,
Company XYZ has outsourced their corporate
website and email to a hosting company. A hacker
who has compromised and is now on the hosting
company’s infrastructure disrupts services by
attempting to break into Company XYZ’s resources.
An administrator at Company XYZ notes the activity
and quickly takes actions to protect company
resources by blocking traffic from network addresses
that are the source of the attack. As a direct
consequence of these actions, Company XYZ
employees lose access to their corporate website and
email.
Illustrative Example 2. A current vulnerability to
widely-deployed web serving software is being
actively exploited. The vendor for the software has
issued a security patch. Company XYZ, who relies on
the software as a critical component of their
e-business platform, rapidly deploys the fix on their
infrastructure. The patch introduces a problem into
the software, causing transactions to fail and
frustrating potential customers who are attempting
to purchase the company’s products.
The next examples illustrate defensive actions that unin-
tentionally harm friendly assets, but do not constitute
FF:
Illustrative Example 3. Company XYZ stores client
personally identifiable information in a central
database. The database is compromised by an
adversary, who then actively engages in exfiltrating
the sensitive data. Company XYZ administrators
detect the extrusion of data and take action to stem
the flow of data by severing the Internet connection
until they can remediate and recover from the attack.
The administrators fully comprehend that no client is
able to access the company’s services while
disconnected, but the induced harm is far less than
harm of continued data exfiltration.
Illustrative Example 4. A network administrator
hastily writes a new firewall rule to block suspected
malicious network traffic. He errors in composing the
rule, but before he catches his mistake, he publishes
the errant rule to production. The rule disrupts the
operations of the company’s web servers, which
inhibits purchases, harming sales.
Cognitive approaches to cyber friendly fire
research
The concept of cyber FF is similar in many respects to
combat friendly fire [3], and like combat friendly fire, a
fundamental cognitive issue lies in maintaining situation
awareness (SA). In addition, cyber FF is closely related
to some aspects of insider threat, especially when viewed
within the broad framework of cyber security failures.
This section provides some background and perspective
on the cognitive foundations for cyber FF.
Cyber security failures and the unintentional insider threat
The domain of cyber security spans a broad spectrum
of research and operational policies to address outsider
cyber threats, insider threats, and other failures such as
accidents or mishaps. Figure 1 provides a conceptual view
of where cyber FF fits within this broader framework of
cyber security failures.
Included in the framework is the familiar branch
(shown in the black boxes) representing cyber attacks
and exploits by malicious insiders, the latter repre-
senting the most highly studied insider threat research
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework of cyber security failures. The embolden path illustrates that cyber FF incidents is a subclass of unintentional
insider threat incidents.
topic. Engineering failures that may be attributed to sys-
tem/hardware/software vulnerabilities are represented in
unfilled boxes. Of most interest for the present discus-
sion are the branches of the hierarchy that relate to human
failures that may be attributed to actions of insiders. The
topic of unintentional insider threat (UIT) has been largely
ignored until recent research by [7] that has provided a
working definition of UIT:
An unintentional insider threat is (1) a current or
former employee, contractor, or business partner (2)
who has or had authorized access to an organization’s
network, system, or data and who, (3) through action
or inaction without malicious intent, (4) unwittingly
causes harm or substantially increases the probability
of future serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity,
or availability of the organization’s resources or assets,
including information, information systems, or
financial systems
As pointed out in [7], UIT incidents share a common
characteristic in which an organizational insider facili-
tates the actual or potential threat event. However, there
is a distinction between the UIT cases that originate with
actions performed by the internal, non-malicious mem-
ber of the organization, versus UIT events that originate
with an outsidemalicious agent (outside agent may recruit
a malicious insider to participate in a collusion attack,
or outside agent may deceive a non-malicious insider to
take actions that enable an attack). These various cases are
depicted in separate branches of Figure 1. The research
reported in [7] relates primarily to the light blue boxes
in Figure 1, especially social engineering exploits, infor-
mation leakage and information compromise. For these
UIT cases, there are four main types of incidents, which
are referred to in [7] as UIT threat vectors: (a) accidental
disclosure (DISC), (b) attack enabled through use of mali-
cious code such as malware or spyware (UIT-HACK), (c)
improper disposal of physical records (PHYS), and (d) lost
or stolen portable equipment (PORT).
We suggest that the cyber FF definition clearly fits
within the above broad definition of UIT. However, UIT
research to date has not considered the case of cyber
friendly fire; for example, cyber friendly fire is not men-
tioned in [7] nor are any cases included in their discussion
or taxonomic descriptions. This is not surprising since
there is no repository of such cases to draw from. By the
same token, our original work on cyber FF emphasized
the differences between cyber FF and insider threat, main-
taining that they are distinct cyber threats. This is true
if one considers only malicious insider threats, but as we
now argue, cyber FF should legitimately be considered as
a special case of UIT.
Therefore, it is useful to examine UIT research and
associated UIT mitigation strategies to identify possible
Carroll et al. Security Informatics 2014, 3:13 Page 4 of 14
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/13
approaches for addressing cyber FF. The area of greatest
commonality between UIT and cyber FF is in human per-
formance failures. As noted in [7]: “A major part of the
UIT definition is the failure in human performance.While
human errors can never be eliminated completely, they
can be dramatically reduced through human error mitiga-
tion techniques. Such techniques should focus on system
conditions that contributed to. . . the resulting errors and
adverse outcomes.” These remarks and associated sugges-
tions for enhancing the decision maker’s situation aware-
ness and reducing human errors pertain just as strongly
to cyber FF mitigation strategies as they do to UIT threat
mitigation. For this reason, we may use the arguments
and suggestions provided in [7] to provide high level orga-
nizational and human factors strategies for combating
cyber FF.
Problems associated with organizational factors, such as
work setting, management systems, and work planning,
may impact employee performance. For example, job
stress [8] and time pressure [9] negatively affect perfor-
mance; heavy and prolonged workload can cause fatigue,
which adversely affects performance [10].Moreover, orga-
nizational factors that increase stress may in turn lead
to human factors/cognitive impacts such as narrowing of
attention (attending to fewer cues) [11,12] and reduced
working memory capacity [13-15]. Cognitive factors asso-
ciated with UIT susceptibility include attention deficits
and poor situation awareness [16,17], lack of knowledge
and memory failures [18-20], and high workload or stress
that impairs performance or judgment [10,21]. Finally,
external or organizational factors may affect an individ-
ual’s emotional states, both normal and abnormal, which
in turn can affect the human error rate and lead to UIT
occurrences.
Cognitive systems perspective
The traditional approach in accounting for performance
failures such as combat friendly fire/fratricide and the
lesser-examined cyber FF is to regard these events as
aberrations—failures of an individual or a system. As with
most performance failures (errors), assigning blame to the
individual(s) responsible for a cyber FF incident is not a
sufficient mitigation strategy: there is typically no single
cause of these errors that occur in the “fog of war”. To
understand the causes (and persistence) of cyber FF, it
is necessary to consider the human factors, and it seems
particularly relevant to address the problem from a cog-
nitive systems/naturalistic decision making perspective
(e.g., [22,23]). Thus, we should ask: How did the individ-
ual perceive the situation? Why did the individual see the
event that way? Why did the individual act in a way that
turned out to be erroneous?
A cognitive systems perspective leads us to consider
research on SA and mental models. The SA scientific
literature is substantial and no attempt is made here
to report exhaustively on this topic. In short, the most
accepted definition of SA is given by Endsley [16]:
SA is the perception of the elements in the environ-
ment within a volume of time and space (Level 1 SA),
the comprehension of their meaning (Level 2 SA), and
the projection of their status into the future (Level 3
SA). Later work by McGuiness and Foy [24] added
the resolution of the situation (Level 4 SA), which is
deciding on a single course of action from a set of
possible actions to achieve the required outcome to the
situation.
SA depends on an accurate mental model [25]. Men-
tal models have been described as well-defined, highly
organized, and dynamic knowledge structures that are
developed over time from experience (e.g., [26]). By rep-
resenting organized “chunks” of information in the envi-
ronment, mental models serve to reduce the information
load that would otherwise overwhelm the ability of deci-
sion makers to attend, process, and integrate the large
amount of information that is inherent in complex oper-
ational environments. Cues in the environment activate
these mental models, which in turn guide the decision-
making process. Appropriate and effective mental models
enable experienced decision makers to correctly assess
and interpret the current situation (Level 1 and Level
2 SA) as well as to select an appropriate action based
on patterns (mental models) stored in their long-term
memory [27].
Considering that a lack of SA is often a contributing fac-
tor to human errors in decision making, it is clear that a
study of cyber FF should focus on factors that affect the
cyber security officer’s/system administrator’s SA. What
constitutes cyber SA?
Tadda and Salerno [28] mapped constructs of SA to
more cyber-relevant network environments. A SA pro-
cess model was constructed that has general applicability
as well as specific relevance to cyber SA. The paper also
suggested a set of metrics that may be useful in assess-
ing the effectiveness of tools for supporting SA. Consis-
tent with Tadda and Salerno’s characterization of SA, our
notion of cyber SA focuses on knowledge of a system’s
topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes
in a system), the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the
components that comprise the system (and populate the
nodes), the nature of the activities or work performed, and
the available defensive (and offensive) countermeasures
that may be applied to thwart network attacks. SA must
also include an understanding of why each node exists,
what it is doing, and the harm associated with disrupt-
ing that function as a response to attack. The trade-offs
between accepting the ongoing risks of attack must be
properly balanced against the damage done to the over-
all organization’s mission, and the process of balancing
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those elements should motivate and guide the defender
to select responses that minimize the total amount of
harm.
More specifically, we may speculate on implications for
cyber defense and cyber SA based on the notion of “digital
SA”a. Given the complexity of cyber structures (particu-
larly at the national scale of critical infrastructures such
as the Internet or the electric power grid), it is necessary
to take a “system of systems” perspective. In this view,
there is never 100 percent certainty or complete knowl-
edge, and it must be assumed that systems will be attacked
(i.e., it is not possible to prevent all attacks with certainty).
Thus, an appropriate cyber security strategy is resiliency,
i.e., the ability to anticipate, avoid, withstand, minimize,
and recover from the effects of attacks (or for that mat-
ter, from the effects of natural disasters). To anticipate
and avoid the effects of attacks or other adverse circum-
stances, a high level of SA is required. In particular, there
is a critical need for operators to anticipate and apply
protocols to avoid cascade effects in the network, thereby
avoiding unintended consequences of defensive or offen-
sive actions. The following types of knowledge (critical
knowledge units) are required to invoke this anticipatory
process:
• Knowledge of each enterprise, enterprise’s network
structure, and network component
• Knowledge of each computer system of interest in
each enterprise/component
• Knowledge of each I/O port on each computer and
how it is being used
• Record of traffic flow and volume on every I/O port
• Knowledge of the results of computing expected
during the normal operation of each of the
components in the network based on the current
traffic flow and volume
• Knowledge of operating limits for each component,
enabling the decision maker to project “faults” that
may lead to shut-downs and cascade failures
• Knowledge of alternative corrective actions for such
faults.
An additional consideration regarding the role of SA and
cognitive models in cyber FF is the importance of Team
SA: the degree to which each team member possesses the
SA required for his or her responsibilities [16] and in par-
ticular, the extent to which team members possess the
same SA on shared SA requirements [29,30]. Conflicts
between goals and/or failures to coordinate goals among
different members of the team are major underlying/root
causes of many cyber FF incidents.
Given these considerations, a recommended approach
is to capture the mental models that constitute the
above types of knowledge, and then to tailor training
approaches and tools to address associated cognitive
factors.
Trends that make digital SA harder
Current trends challenge the abilities of individuals and
teams to maintain digital SA; more particularly, changes
in the roles and communications among cyber security
professionals, as well as paradigmatic changes brought
about by cloud and utility computing, have increased
the difficulty of acquiring, understanding, and main-
taining critical knowledge units necessary for effective
defense and operation of the information and commu-
nications infrastructure. One trend is a growing sepa-
ration between the roles of individuals responsible for
cyber defense mission planning and the roles of individ-
uals responsible for operating and defending the infor-
mation and communications infrastructure. Missions are
defined in terms of abstract resources and quality of ser-
vice attributes, rather than actual systems and devices.
For example, a mission in support of a business-to-
business portal is defined in terms of number of con-
current users and user experience attributes, such as
page response time. The requirements are translated
into resource and location requirements (e.g., “ten web
servers in the East Coast data center will be tasked”). In
many cases, external third parties provide and operate
the infrastructure. Under these circumstances, the mis-
sion planner may not be aware of what resources are
allocated, the underlying network topology, or the geo-
graphical location of the resources. The operators and
defenders are compartmentalized—and often isolated—
from the mission planners, understand the resources and
infrastructure but are unaware of the missions that the
infrastructure is serving. Communication between mis-
sion planners, operators, and defenders is complicated—if
it can occur at all (e.g., “need to know” restrictions)—
because planners focus on the mission, while opera-
tors and defenders focus on resources. A second trend,
offered by cloud and utility computing, employs dynamic
resource allocations in response to changing demands
and requirements. Dynamic resource management can
quickly revise and relocate allocations, as well as change
the purpose or criticality of systems—this changing oper-
ational landscape challenges the ability of cyber defenders
to maintain an accurate accounting of system resources,
assets, and vulnerabilities. The ability to acquire and
maintain critical knowledge units that are needed to
support effective SA for defending these types of enter-
prises exceeds the efforts of an individual or even a small
team—it demands the support of an entire enterprise and
its complement of third parties, an extremely difficult
goal. Research is needed to flesh out requirements for
information sharing and for automated tools, visualiza-
tion support, and decision aids to ensure that defenders
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have the necessary knowledge and SA to protect their
enterprise.
Mitigation approaches
In this section, we describe approaches and tools to
mitigate cyber FF. Following research on organizational
factors underlying human error, we first discuss organi-
zational best practices (Section ‘Organizational best prac-
tices’) that are recommended to foster productive work
environments, relieve stress, and reduce cognitive load.
Next, in Section ‘Training’, we discuss relevant research
on learning and cognition that may be applied to improve
the effectiveness of training approaches in reducing the
likelihood of cyber FF outcomes. In Section ‘Effects of
stress on performance’, we discuss implications of this
research for the design and development of tools to help
enhance SA and decision making (for example, by pro-
moting the acquisition and use of critical knowledge units
elaborated in Section ‘Cognitive systems perspective’).
Organizational best practices
Following their discussion of possible organizational and
human factors that contribute UIT, [7] described possible
UIT mitigation strategies. Organizational best practices
suggested in [7] that are most relevant to mitigating the
incidence of cyber FF are those that help to reduce cog-
nitive load, stress, and ultimately lead to lower risks of
human errors:
• Review and improve management practices to align
resources with tasks.
• Improve data flow by enhancing communication and
maintaining accurate procedures.
• Maintain productive work setting by minimizing
distractions.
• Implement effective work planning and control to
reduce job pressure and manage time.
• Maintain employee readiness.
• Maintain staff values and attitudes that align with
organizational mission and ethics.
• Implement security best practices throughout the
organization.
Training
Conventional training, simulation-based training, and war
gaming can each be utilized as parts of an integrated strat-
egy to educate, raise awareness about cognitive biases
and limitations, develop coping skills, and exercise skills
designed to mitigate the environmental and situational
factors that increase the likelihood of cyber FF. The goal
of such training approaches is to provide the learner with
experiences and instruction on cues, mental models, and
actions that, with practice, will help establish a reper-
toire of well-learned concepts that can be executed under
stressful or in novel, uncertain conditions. To address
training requirements and approaches to reduce cyber
FF, it is useful to examine factors that impact cogni-
tion and human performance, particularly with regard
to SA. Research has demonstrated a number of factors
that impact performance; in the present context, effects
of stress, overlearning, and issues relating to cognitive
bias are particularly relevant. Greitzer and Andrews [31]
review cognitive foundations and implications for training
to mitigate combat friendly fire. Here we describe aspects
of this research that are pertinent to training requirements
for cyber FF.
Effects of stress on performance
Stress has strong effects on every aspect of cognition
from attention to memory to judgment and decision mak-
ing. Under stress, attention appears to channel or tunnel,
reducing focus on peripheral information and central-
izing focus on main tasks [32]. Originally observed by
Kohn [33], this finding has been replicated often, first
by seminal work from Easterbrook [34] demonstrating a
restriction in the range of cues attended to under stress
conditions (tunneling) and many other studies (see [35]).
Research by Janis and Mann [36] suggests that periph-
eral stimuli are likely to be the first to be screened
out or ignored, and that under stress, individuals may
make decisions based on incomplete information. Sim-
ilarly, Friedman and Mann [37] note that individuals
under stress may fail to consider the full range of alterna-
tives available, ignore long-term consequences, and make
decisions based on oversimplifying assumptions—often
referred to as heuristics. Research on the effects of stress
on vigilance and sustained attention, particularly regard-
ing effects of fatigue and sleep deprivation, shows that vig-
ilance tends to be enhanced by moderate levels of arousal
(stress), but sustained attention appears to decrease with
fatigue and loss of sleep [38].
Overlearning
Several investigations have shown that tasks that are well-
learned tend to be more resistant to the effects of stress
than those that are less-well-learned. Extended practice
leads to commitment of the knowledge to long term
memory and easier retrieval, as well as automaticity and
the proceduralization of tasks. These over-learned behav-
iors tend to require less attentional control and fewer
mental resources [39,40], which facilitates enhanced per-
formance and yields greater resistance to the negative
effects of stress—i.e., overlearned behaviors are less likely
to be forgotten and more easily recalled under stress.
Van Overschelde and Healy [41] found that linking new
facts learned under stress with preexisting knowledge sets
helps to diminish the negative effect of stress. On the
other hand, there is also a tendency for people under
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stress to “fall-back” to early-learned behavior [42-44]—
even less efficient or more error prone behavior than
more recently-learned strategies—possibly because the
previously learned strategies or knowledge are more well-
learned and more available than recently acquired knowl-
edge.
Effects of stress on learning
Research suggests that high stress during instruction
tends to degrade an individual’s ability to learn. The
research literature consistently demonstrates that ele-
ments of working memory are impaired, although the
mechanisms behind these effects are poorly under-
stood [35]. Stress appears to differentially affect working
memory phases [45,46]. One instructional strategy to
address stress effects is to use a phased approach with
an initial learning phase under minimum stress, followed
by gradual increasing exposure to stress more consistent
with real-world conditions [31]. Similarly, stress inocu-
lation training attempts to immunize an individual from
reacting negatively to stress exposure. The method pro-
vides increasingly realistic pre-exposure to stress through
training simulation; through successive approximations,
the learner builds a sense of positive expectancy and out-
come and a greater sense of mastery and confidence.
This approach also helps to habituate the individual to
anxiety-producing stimuli.
Team performance
Finally, it is important to consider group processes in
this context. Research on team decision making indicates
that effective teams are able to adapt and shift strate-
gies under stress; therefore, team training procedures
should teach teams to adapt to high stress conditions by
improving their coordination strategies. Driskell, Salas,
and Johnston [47] observed the common phenomenon
of Easterbrook’s attentional narrowing is also applicable
to group processes. They demonstrated that stress can
reduce group focus necessary to maintain proper coor-
dination and SA—i.e., team members were more likely
to shift to individualistic focus than maintaining a team
focus.
Implications
Based on the brief foregoing discussion, we can summa-
rize the challenges and needs for more effective training
in general terms as well as more specifically focused
on cyber defense and mitigation of cyber FF: training
should incorporate stress situations and stress manage-
ment techniques, development of realistic scenarios that
systematically vary stress (e.g., as produced by varying
cognitive workload through tempo of operations and
density of attacks), and addressing challenges in prepar-
ing cyber warriors to overcome cognitive biases. The
following factors should be included in designing training
approaches:
• Training should provide extended practice,
promoting more persistent memory and easier
retrieval, and to encourage automaticity and the
proceduralization of tasks to make them more
resistant to the effects of stress.
• Training scenarios should include complex/dynamic
threats that reflect the uncertainties of the real
world—scenarios that force trainees to operate
without perfect information and that incorporate
surprises that challenge preconceptions or
assumptions.
• Training scenarios should be designed to encourage
the habit of testing one’s assumptions to produce
more adaptive, resilient cyber defense performance in
the face of uncertainty.
• Training should enhance awareness of the effects of
stress on cognitive performance—such as tunneling
and flawed decision making strategies that ignore
information—and coping strategies to moderate
these effects. The training should be designed to
make as explicit as possible what might happen to
skill and knowledge under stress.
• Train awareness of cognitive biases and practices for
managing these biases.
• Team training should focus on strategies for
maintaining group cohesion and coordination,
mitigating the tendency for team members to revert
to an individual perspective and lose shared SA.
• Training should exercise the execution of cognitive
tasks by both individuals and groups.
Tools
A key objective in the study of factors influencing cyber FF
and mitigation strategies is to identify features of deci-
sion support tools with potential to reduce the occurrence
of cyber FF. Our review of relevant research, as summa-
rized in the foregoing discussion, strongly suggests that
tools and visualizations to improve cyber SA are key ingre-
dients of desired solutions. Important functions should
include decision aids to support memory limitations, to
counteract the negative effects of stress on performance
(e.g., perceptual narrowing), and to avoid the negative
consequences of cognitive biases on decisions.
Supportingmemory limitations that reduce situation
awareness
As stated earlier, support for the cyber analyst should
strive to encourage proactive decision making processes
that anticipate and apply protocols to avoid cascade effects
in the network, and concurrently avoid unintended con-
sequences of defensive or offensive actions. We identified
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a set of critical knowledge units required for enhanced SA
and anticipatory decision making, including knowledge
of components of the network, details of each computer
system, I/O ports, traffic flow/volumes, and ability to
project impacts of possible courses of action. Decision
aids and/or visualization support is needed to alleviate
memory lapses and limitations by providing readily acces-
sible information on network topology and component
assets/vulnerabilities—typically referred to as external
representations or external memory by researchers advo-
cating the study of “distributed cognition” in the broader
context of the social and physical environment that must
be interwoven with the decision maker’s internal repre-
sentations (also referred to as “situated cognition” [48,49]).
Thus, a decision aid that displays critical knowledge units
for components that are being considered for application
of remedial actions may help to avoid cyber FF effects
that impair system effectiveness. This concept is similar
to what Tadda and Salerno [28] refer to as “Knowledge of
Us” (data relevant to the importance of assets or capabili-
ties of the enterprise)—hence, a process that identifies to
the decision maker whether there is a potential or current
impact to capabilities or assets used to perform a mission.
Similarly, a tool may be envisioned that helps the deci-
sion maker understand and prioritize risks that may be
computed for various possible alternative actions.
Mitigating cognitive biases
Gestalt psychology tells us that we tend to see what we
expect to see. Expectancy effects can lead to such selec-
tive perception as well as biased decisions or responses to
situations in the form of other cognitive biases like con-
firmation bias (the tendency to search for or interpret
information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions)
or irrational escalation (the tendency to make irrational
decisions based upon rational decisions in the past). The
impact of cognitive biases on decision performance—
particularly response selection—is to foster decisions by
individuals and teams that are based on prejudices or
expectations that they have gained from information
learned before they are in the response situation. Deci-
sion aids and visualizations are needed that help to reduce
confirmation bias, irrational escalation, and other forms
of impaired decision making. One possible form of deci-
sion support designed to counteract these biases is the
use of the analysis of competing hypotheses (e.g., [50]).
Other concepts that may serve as sources of ideas and
strategies for the design of decision aids may be derived
from problem solving techniques discussed by Jones in
The Thinker’s Toolkit [51].
Recommendations
Based on the foregoing discussion, we summarize the
challenges and needs for more effective training and
decision support to improve cyber defense and mitigate
cyber FF:
• Training recommendations
– Develop realistic cyber war gaming scenarios
that systematically vary stress (e.g., as
produced by varying cognitive workload
through tempo of operations and density of
attacks)
– Incorporate stress management techniques
– Address challenges in preparing cyber
warriors to overcome cognitive biases
– Conduct experiments to assess effectiveness
of different training approaches
• Information analysis and decision support
recommendations
– Conduct experiments to help identify
effective features of decision support and
information visualization tools. Will
conventional training approaches to improve
analytic process (e.g., analysis of alternative
hypotheses, other decision making tools and
strategies) be effective in the cyber domain?
Our intuition suggests that the answer is “no”
because of the massive data, extreme time
constraints requiring near real-time
responses, and the largely data-driven nature
of the problem. New types of data
preprocessing (triage) and visualization
solutions will likely be needed to improve SA.
– Perform cognitive engineering research to
develop prospective information analysis and
visual analytics solutions to enhance SA and
decrease cyber FF.
Research test bed and preliminary studies
As concluded in Section ‘Mitigation approaches’, more
research is needed to enhance our understanding of the
factors underlying cyber FF and to explore and validate
possible mitigation approaches and tools. Cognitive engi-
neering research is needed to focus on determinants of
SA deficiencies and human errors in working with tools
aimed to support cyber security analyst perception and
decision making processes.
Research in cyber FF should be founded upon scien-
tific principles and empirical studies in human factors
and cognitive engineering, such as seminal human fac-
tors work on SA by Endsley [16] and later by Tadda and
Salerno [28], whomapped constructs of SA tomore cyber-
relevant network environments. The present paper has
sought to define research questions and to lay a founda-
tion for empirical investigations of factors contributing
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to the cyber FF phenomenon and impacts on perfor-
mance of proposed mitigations that can be in the form of
training/awareness or decision aids.
Along these lines, we conducted a preliminary study at
PNNL to help address these research questions using the
simulation capabilities of PNNL’s Unclassified Security
Test Range test bed. The purpose of the pilot study was to
demonstrate feasibility of an experimental methodology
to assess effectiveness of decision aids and visualizations
for cyber security analysis. Because the experiment was
limited to a very small number of participants, inter-
pretation of results was speculative, but the design and
implementation of the testbed itself serve to advance the
research goals described here.
Unclassified security test range
The Unclassified Security Test Range consists of a combi-
nation of virtual and physical devices for testing, simula-
tion, and evaluation. This closed network offers services
found on a production network without the costs asso-
ciated with duplicating a real environment. The idea is
to duplicate enough of a real network to allow the test
bed to appear realistic. In order to achieve this lofty
goal, the virtual and physical environment is flexible
and can be customized to represent different configura-
tions based on requirements. With the proper configu-
ration and orchestration of components, it is possible to
create simulated environments that model Fortune 500
enterprises, and application and infrastructure service
providers. The test range also has a room that is mocked
up as an advanced “network operation center”. Besides
workstations provisioned with several large monitors,
there were two large over head displays, allowing the
projection of visualization such as network health and
status. Observers can watch subjects from a vantage
point, which is partially obscured from the participants
view.
The test range creates virtual machines for user work-
stations and servers that interconnected using real net-
working switches, routers, and firewalls. Every virtual
machine has at least two network interfaces, one for
management and observation, and one or more for exper-
iment network traffic. The test range features a unique
simulation capability called ANTS. This software pack-
age simulates user behaviors: agents that are deployed
on the virtual machines network have models or profiles
of operator’s use of real applications such as Microsoft
Word, Outlook, and Internet Explorer. Application usage
then generates the traffic found in normal networks. The
advantage of this approach over others is its ability to
create higher fidelity.
The test range has a network monitoring feature that
provides the capability to monitor, log, and analyze all the
traffic flowing through the network. Additionally, remote
researchers and observers are provided a capability to
view into the range.
Procedure
The test bed was configured to appear as an e-commerce
website, a payment processor, and an “Internet” to fer-
ret communication between e-commerce site and pay-
ment processor, and customers and malcontents to the
e-commerce site. Participants were tasked with the role
of network and security operations and were responsi-
ble for maintaining the operation of the e-commerce site.
They were confronted with two types of events that inter-
fered with customers assessing the website. The first event
type, which manifested several times during the scenario,
was a fault in the order-processing system that triggered
the abnormal execution termination of the the order sys-
tem. The second event was a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that
originated from the payment processor partner. While a
partner attacking appears exceptional, there have been
cases in which attackers have exploited partner relation-
ships and used compromised partners as stepping stones
to further their compromise towards reaching their goals.
The DoS attack consumed large quantities of resources,
slowing customer access. Both events appear, at least at
first glance, to be similar.
Participants were furnished with four widely available
tools. The first is Big Brother (BB) system and network
monitor. BB was configured to monitor various aspects
of the system and network object attributes (e.g., CPU
utilization, data rate, system event logs) and alerts when
these object attributes exceed defined thresholds. BB sup-
plies alert notifications in an easily understood panel.
Figure 2 is a screen shot of the simulation’s Big Brother
network overview that is displaying “all conditions clear”.
The single alert informs the administrator that the system
is unable to download updated malware/virus signatures.
By design, the Test Range is isolated and constituent sys-
tems are unable to communicate with systems on the
Internet. The second tool for monitoring is the Cisco
ASA’s ASDM panel (shown in Figure 3). The overview
panel displays current network conditions, such as data
rate and connection volume. Other ASDM panels display
detailed network traffic traces and assist in traffic inspec-
tion. Half the participants was also furnished with Ether-
Ape, a network monitor that displays network activity
graphically. As depicted in Figure 4, the interface color-
fully renders communication between systems by drawing
a link between systems. The width of the link changes
in proportion to the volume of traffic, i.e., the link width
expands as traffic increases.
Participants
Participants were four PNNL network operations staff,
solicited via email as study volunteers. The invitation
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Figure 2 The Big Brother (BB) network and systemmonitor overview page. Each row is a network resource; each column is an indicator of a
test result of the resource status. A green orb indicates healthy, while a red orb denotes a failed test.
Figure 3 Cisco’s ADSM network overview panel. The current status of firewall’s interfaces are shown in the top right panel. The middle panels
graph in real time resource utilization, connection rate, and data rate. Lastly, the bottom panel shows the device’s system log messages.
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Figure 4 EtherApe network visualization tool. Rays indicate communicating systems; ray widths is proportional to data rates.
stated that they were invited to participate in several sim-
ulated scenarios as part of a study on network monitoring
and security. The participants originate from different
parts of PNNL and perform different job functions. Sum-
marizing their jobs, two participants provide IT support
for cyber security and national security research and
development groups, another participant provides IT sup-
port for PNNL’s various business applications, and the
last performs a variety of tasks in support of general sci-
entific computing. While every participant understood
the concepts and skills necessary in performing the tasks
at hand, only one had previous experience in operat-
ing in a small business climate as illustrated by the pilot
study scenario. Examining the remaining three partici-
pants, two can be ranked as having intermediate level
of experience and the last having little experience. All
participants were familiar with the use of Big Brother net-
work/systemmonitoring tool; in fact, all use it daily as part
of their jobs. The experienced participant had some min-
imal level of exposure to the Cisco ASA and its ASDM
overview page. No other participant had any prior experi-
ence. Finally, none of the participants had any exposure to
EtherApe.
All participants were provided with BB and Cisco
ASDMmonitoring tools. Two participants were randomly
selected (here identified as Participant 2 and Participant 4)
and were furnished with EtherApe, which represented the
“enhanced visualization” condition.
Results
To review, all participants had ready access to BB and
Cisco ASDM monitoring tools; two were also provided
with EtherApe as an additional visualization aid.
Participant 1 (without EtherApe) From our perch,
it was not evident if the participant was choosing to
use either Big Brother or the ASDM panel. During
the first phase of the exercise, he relied on the alerts
provided by the help desk before remediating
problems. Due to a technical difficulty, the attack
never reached a point to harm the ordering system.
He did note the attack on the ASDM general
overview panel and chose to ignore it.
Participant 2 (with EtherApe) This participant was
hyper vigilant. Unfortunately, his choices and actions
lead to cyber friendly fire. Nevertheless, his actions
constitute cyber FF. He relied heavily on the ASDM
overview display and noted problems nearly
instantaneously. During the first phase, he reacted to
the information by disabling the external interface of
the ASA firewall device—in effect he chose to cut his
network off from the Internet, thus committing
textbook definition of cyber friendly fire. After we
witnessed the participant act in this way twice, we
informed the participant of the consequences.
Unfortunately this was to no avail, as the participant
disabled the external interface and was attempting to
Carroll et al. Security Informatics 2014, 3:13 Page 12 of 14
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/13
disable the internal interface during the DoS attack.
If successful, he would no longer have remote access
to administer the firewall.
Participant 3 (without EtherApe) The least
experienced of the four participants, he preferred
ASDM overview display over the Big Brother status
display. He was methodical. In the first phase, he
gathered available information before deciding on the
course of restarting the ordering system. The
deliberate approach was slow. While the participants
1 and 2 took under two minutes to note and correct
the problem, it took him at least two minutes before
taking corrective action. Four minutes passed before
he realized the advent of the DoS attack and it took
another three minutes before he decided to take any
action.
Participant 4 (with Etherape) He was the most
experienced of all the participants. While not part of
his daily job function, he has served as a network
operator in a part time job. During the exercise he
was leaning back in his chair watching the EtherApe
visualization or hunched over staring at the ASDM
overview display. His response was rapid and in most
cases remediated problems in under thirty seconds.
Not once did we need to announce the occurrence of
an event. He noted the DoS attack immediately from
both the EtherApe and ASDM displays. He
performed a packet trace and identified the source as
the payment processor and that the attacking system
was a critical component in processing payment
transactions. He recognized that making changes to
the firewall may cause harm later on; he would prefer
contacting the partner first.
Discussion
It is not possible to draw generalizations from the small
number of participants, particularly because of technical
difficulties that affected performance of Participant 1 (and
perhaps also because of existence of doubts about whether
or not Participant 2 understood the instructions suffi-
ciently to follow directions). Focus on results obtained for
Participants 3 and 4 yields precious little data upon which
to draw conclusions.
At a shallow level of analysis, we note that Participant 4
(who received the enhanced visualization condition) per-
formed much better than Participant 3 (who did not
receive the enhanced visualization condition). Besides the
obvious conclusion that the experimental manipulation
was effective, there are other possible explanations due
to uncontrolled confounding factors: For example, Partic-
ipant 4 had more experience than Participant 3. Because
of time and budget constraints, we were unable to con-
duct a somewhat larger pilot study that could incorporate
appropriate controls (such as a pretest-post-test design).
While we did not identify objectives related to training,
some observations from the pilot study suggest training
implications. Even when informed of the consequences of
his choices, Participant 2 continued to engage in actions
that resulted in cyber FF. This could have been a result
of lack of experience with network and firewall opera-
tions, or possibly he missed the “message” communicated
during the orientation session about the importance of
maintaining business operations; or perhaps he believed
that he was, in fact, taking the best course of action. In any
case, this observation suggests that training approaches
should be considered.
Because this was a pilot study, limitations and diffi-
culties were not unexpected. Nevertheless, we still may
conclude that the results at least suggest that one can
demonstrate cyber FF performance differences that pos-
sibly can be related to the independent variable studied
(visualization support); and perhaps more importantly for
the present purposes, the Unclassified Cyber Test Range
that we utilized at PNNL appears to be capable of sup-
porting experimental studies of cyber FF. This point is
important going forward, since it reinforces the recom-
mended research strategy of conducting more controlled
scientific studies of cyber SA and cyber FF in a high fidelity
simulated environment.
Conclusions and recommendations that serve to inform
future design of such experimental studies are:
• Access to a larger pool of participants is needed to
allow for the possibility of statistically significant
results. The observational methods employed,
interview procedures, and the performance measures
collected would readily apply to an expanded study
with more participants.
• Participants should have a more relevant background
and experience with the type of enterprise and
network represented in the scenario. Participants
should be fluent in the technical skills required to
perform necessary actions. Experience ought to be
controlled as a factor in the study.
Much more specific recommendations about the design
and human factors of the Cyber Test Range were derived
from observing the participants and obtaining feedback
from the participants including deficiencies in software
packages, monitor placement, choice of keyboard and
mice, and the height of the overhead displays.
Conclusions and future direction
Cyber FF is one class of cyber security failures. Since it
is based in human failure, we have argued that cyber FF
belongs to a sub-class of cyber security failures that is
characterized by unintentional insider threats. There is
a tendency to regard such failures as aberrations that
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can be fixed with technological advances, such as tech-
nology solutions to improve SA, to increase accuracy
in identifying targets, or to improve the precision of
defensive or offensive actions. We have argued that a
sound mitigation strategy, whether or not incorporating
technological advancements, must be focused on identi-
fying and accommodating the realities of human perfor-
mance. Contributing factors attributed to cyber FF must
be empirically studied along with the benefits of train-
ing, awareness, and tools meant to reduce the number
and severity of incidents. To this end, we have described
a preliminary study that we conducted that demonstrates
cyber FF research in a controlled, isolated testbed envi-
ronment. While results where speculative due to the small
number of participants, it does demonstrate that exper-
imentation in a testbed can advance the research goals
described within.
Related research is ongoing: An advanced concept
that is currently being pursued by PNNL cyber security
research programs is the notion of Asymmetric Resilient
Cybersecurity (ARC)b, which is characterized by goals
of standing up resilient and robust cyber infrastructure
and network architectures that present a “moving tar-
get” to potential attackers in an attempt to overcome
and hopefully reverse the current asymmetric state of
affairs that favors the adversary. The goals and chal-
lenges of this program align with issues that we have
articulated in our research on cyber FF, particularly in
ways that can be seen as amplifying the cyber FF chal-
lenge: e.g., maintaining enterprise-wide SA when the net-
work, systems, and components “move” continuously and
dynamically. Moreover, ongoing research at PNNL seeks
to develop and assess visualization and decision support
tools that address cognitive limitations. Current research
is developing Kritikos, a network resource identification,
resource dependency discovery, and criticality assess-
ment tool. Dependencies are identified by Self-Organizing
Maps (SOM), a neural network machine learning algo-
rithm, discovering repeated spatio-temporal patterns in IP
Information Flow eXport (IPFIX) record sets. Patterns in
time and space indicate usage; repeated observations of
a pattern suggest a dependent relationship. The patterns
allow a dependency-based network model to be gener-
ated. This model is a (disconnected) graph where vertices
are resources and edges indicate dependent relation-
ships. A business process/operations model annotated
with indication of network resources and business critical-
ity, assumptions not unusual for today’s enterprises, can
be fused with the network model, illuminating indirect
resources. Furthermore, the relationship between busi-
ness process and network resources can be used to assess
the criticality of resources in terms of business objectives
and requirements. Cyber FF research also directly meets
essential needs of DOE cyber security as well as cyber
security programs within the DoD and the intelligence
community.
The fundamental research goal is to develop a sci-
entific understanding of the behavioral implications of
cyber FF. Research is needed to extend our current
understanding of cyber SA and to develop metrics and
measures for cyber FF. The principal scientific research
questions include: What are root causes of cyber FF?
What are possible mitigating solutions, both human fac-
tors and technical/automated? We have examined rele-
vant research and cognitive theory, and we have taken
some initial steps toward investigating these research
questions in empirical laboratory studies using realistic
test scenarios in a cyber SA/FF testbed facility [52]. Con-
tinued empirical research is required to investigate the
phenomenon and relevant contributing factors as well
as mitigation strategies. A major objective should be to
investigate approaches to and assessment of effectiveness
of cyber FF mitigation strategies, such as training and
decision aids/tools. Such research promises to advance
the general field of cyber SA and inform other ongoing
cyber security research. In addition, it is hoped that this
research will facilitate the design and prototyping of auto-
mated or semi-automated systems (or decision aids) to
increase cyber SA and eliminate or decrease cyber FF;
this provides a foundation for development of com-
mercial products that enhance system effectiveness and
resiliency.
Endnotes
aThe following discussion is based in part on an essay
on situation awareness in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Situation_awareness.
bInformation about PNNL’s Asymmetric Resilient
Cybersecurity (ARC) Lab Direct Research &
Development Initiative can be found at: http://
cybersecurity.pnnl.gov/arc.stm.
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